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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT, SUBROGATION AND
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTE IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUcrToN
A is involved in an automobile collision with B, with resulting damage to
A's car. A has collision coverage with C insurance company, which fulfiills its
obligation under the insurance contract by paying some or all of the costs of repair.
The insurance company then either commences, or causes to be commenced, a suit
in A's name to recover the total amount of the damage. This suit is met by a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action is not prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. Will or should the motion prevail?
A certain degree of uncertainty has arisen as to the answer to this question,
but it seems that such motions are presently very often granted by the trial courts
of Missouri., The real party in interest statute, Section 507.010, Revised Statutes
of Missouri (1949), sheds little light on the problem. The statute provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,
but an executor, administrator, guardian, curator, trustee of an express
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for
the benefit of another or a party authorized by statute may sue in his
own name in such representative capacity without joining with him the
party for whose benefit the action is brought; and, when a statute so pro-
vides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the
name of the State of Missouri.
It is submitted, however, that the uncertainty in this area is due in large part to
a failure of the trial courts, and sometimes appellate courts, to distinguish the
situation where, under a clause in an insurance contract, there is an assignment
by the insured, and the situation where the insurer is subrogated to the rights
of the insured, either as provided for by the terms of the contract or through the
workings of the common law doctrine of subrogation.2 The purpose of this comment
is to show that the courts should distinguish between an assignment and a subroga-
tion in applying the real party in interest provision and thereby to show that there
is no need for the uncertainty in this area.
1. Information to the effect that such motions are quite frequently granted
by the trial courts has been received through the subrogation offices of the insur-
ance companies of Missouri.
2. There will be the problem in many cases of whether an instrument is an
assignment of a claim or is only a reiteration of the common law principles of
subrogation. There are of course no definite rules as to what words will constitute
either an assignment or a subrogation, and the wording of each instrument must
be considered independently. Nor is it the intention of the writers to lay down
any such rules, but merely to assess the problem of the real party in interest once
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II. DiSTINcrioN BETWEEN ASSIGNMENT AND SUBROGATION
Appellate courts have incautiously used such language as: "There are many
cases holding that an assignment, whether by subrogation or by written instrument
does not transfer the cause of action"; s or, "The assignment of the owner's cause
of action by operation of the principle of subrogation ... ."!' The use of such lan-
guage has undoubtedly contributed to the trial courts' failures to consider fully the
difference between an assignment under the insurance contract and a subrogation
under contract or by operation of law when a motion is made by a defendant (being
sued by the insured) for dismissal of the action on the grounds that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Under present Missouri law
the sustaining of such a motion is improper unless this distinction is drawn, and
a decision given accordingly.
Notwithstanding the faulty language sometimes seen in the appellate decisions,
the leading Missouri cases in this area have recognized the distinction between
assignment and subrogation.
In Steele v. Goosen5 a motion was made to dismiss an action for property
damage brought by the insured, on the basis that the insured was not the real
party in interest. The plaintiff-insured had received payment for less than his total
property loss from the insurance company and had executed the following writing
to the insurer:
And in consideration of said payment the insured hereby assign [sic] and
transfer [sic] to the said company, such and all claims, rights and demands
against any person, persons, corporation or property arising from or con-
nected with such loss or damage, and said company is subrogated in the
place of and to the claims and demands of the insured against such person,
persons, corporation or property in the premises who may be liable or
hereafter adjudged liable for the burning, theft, destruction, or damage to
said property to the extent of the amount hereby paid.6 (Emphasis added.)
The court upheld the decision of the circuit court in dismissing the action, saying:
"The document signed by the plaintiff constituted an assignment to the insurer
of plaintiff's entire claim for property damage, although as the policy provided,
plaintiff received $50.00 less than the cost of repairs to his automobile."? The court
thus gave controlling effect to the language "hereby assign and transfer" and dis-
regarded any reference to subrogation in the writing executed by the insured.
In Hayes v. Jenkins5 the Springfield Court of Appeals considered the case under
the assumption that the plaintiff had been fully indemnified by his insurer for
the damage sustained to his vehicle. The case apparently involved no express
provision in the policy and a common law subrogation arose. A motion to dismiss
3. Landau v. Schmitt Contracting Co., 237 Mo. App. 908, 920, 179 S.W.2d
138, 143 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930).
4. Swift & Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 149 Mo. App. 526, 533, 131 S.W. 124, 125
(K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
5. 329 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. 1959).
6. Id. at 711.
7. Id. at 711.
8. 337 S.W.2d 259 (Spr. Ct. App. 1960).
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on the ground that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest had been over-
ruled by the trial court. On appeal the trial court's action was affirmed. The court
held that the insured-subrogor could bring the action in his own name, stating:
"The general rule is that a bare legal title to the action is sufficient to maintain an
action at law." The court then went on to say that regardless of whether there
was full or partial payment under the policy the result would be the same.10 The
court recognized that the result would be otherwise in the case of an assignment,
but pointed out that assignment was not involved.1"
These two well reasoned cases serve to illustrate the controlling difference in
Missouri between the assignment of a claim, and a subrogation to a claim. When
there is an assignment of an entire claim there is a complete divestment of rights
from the assignor and a vesting of these same rights in the assignee.12 In the case
of subrogation, however, only an equitable right passes to the subrogee and the
legal title to the claim is never removed from the subrogor but remains with him
throughout.-3 Within both areas, assignment and subrogation, there are, of course,
refinements which must be made and problems which must be brought to light
in view of the decisions of courts in both Missouri and other jurisdictions. Each
area will be examined in turn.
A. Assignment
1. Assignability of a Chose in Action
A chose in action, "a known legal expression used to describe all personal
rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by
taking physical possession,"' 4 was not assignable at early common law; in fact,
non-assignability was its main characteristic. This characteristic was due in large
part to the fact that such rights were considered personal in nature, and also was
based on the doctrines against champerty and maintenance.1 5 The first relaxation
of the general rule occurred when the courts of law began to allow an action by
the assignee for his own benefit but in the name of the assignor when the former
was appointed an attorney of the assignor to bring action for the debt.1 6 However,
since objections were still being made on the basis of maintenance, before such
actions would be allowed it was necessary to show the relationship of debtor-
creditor between the assignor and assignee. But, by the eighteenth century, equity
had come to recognize the validity of the assignment of debts and other choses in
9. Id. at 261.
10. ". . . iTlhe test is not whether the injured party has been paid in full
or in part, but whether the claim has been satisfied and released, or whether it
has been assigned." 337 S.W.2d at 262.
11. "... . [Ilf the cause itself has been assigned the claimant would no longer
have any interest and could not maintain it." 337 S.W.2d at 261-262.
12. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACrs §§ 432, 432(a), 446(a), 447 (3rd ed. 1960);
4 CORBIN, CONTRAcTs § 858 (1951); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs ch. 7 (1932).
13. Pringle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 212 S.C. 303, 47 S.E.2d 722 (1948)
(leading case).
14. Torkington v. Magee, 2 K.B. 427, 430 (1902).
15. On the history of assignments of choses in action see Holdsworth, The
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action and did not require a showing of a special relationship between the assignor
and assignee in order to rebut the presumption of maintenance.17 Shortly thereafter
the law courts took the same view with respect to the assignment of debts, although
they still required the appointment of attorney, thus continuing in form the general
rule against assignability of choses in action.'8 Further inroads on non-assignability
have been made, so that it is generally stated today that, "a right of action gen-
erally is assignable where it would survive to the assignor's legal representative." 19
This general rule is subject, of course, to local statutes providing for survival or
non-survival of certain actions. 20 A final erosion of the non-assignability doctrine
occurred when the real party in interest statutes2' were enacted and the fiction of
the appointment of attorney was thereby abandoned.
Thus, there has been almost a complete reversal from the historical position of
non-assignability of a chose in action. Likewise, the courts have seemingly reversed
themselves on the question of who is the proper party to bring the action, and
it can now be said that:
It is no longer even 'proper' to sue in the name of A [assignor] in states
where by statute the suit must be brought in the name of the 'real party
in interest.' On proof that the right has been assigned, the suit will be dis-
missed unless it is shown that A is suing as agent and attorney of the
assignee, C, and that C is the real plaintiff. So far from the assignee
being the agent of the assignor, it now appears that the assignor can sue
only as the agent of the assignee. 22
2. Effect of an Assignment
The Springfield court in Hayes v. Jenkins indicates the usual view as to what
passes by an assignment by concluding "if the cause itself has been assigned the
claimant would no longer have any interest and could not maintain it."23 Perhaps
it would be more indicative of the actual position of the parties if it were said that
an assignment of an entire claim takes all rights, legal and equitable, which the
assignor had in relation to the assigned claim, from the assignor and places those
same rights in his assignee. 24 In Missouri and other "notice jurisdictions" 25 the
assignor, even though devoid of any rights in the claim, is not devoid of any
power, for under certain circumstances 28 an assignor may, by a subsequent assign-
ment, defeat the rights of the prior assignee in the claim. It should be noticed that
the doctrine which recognizes power in the assignor to defeat the rights of the
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 6 C.J.S. Assigmnents § 30 (1937).
20. See §§ 537.010-.030, RSMo 1949, on survival of actions in Missouri.
21. See 3 WILLISTON, op. crt. supra note 12, § 446.
22. Corbin, Assignment of Contract Rights, SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW
OF CoNTRAcrs 724 (1934).
23. 337 S.W.2d at 261-262.
24. See authorities cited supra note 12.
25. See Chapter 410, RSMo 1949, for special statutes relating to notice of
assignment.
26. See Murdock & Dickson v. Finney, 21 Mo. 138 (1855); Chapter 410,
RSMo 1949. See also Annots., 31 A:L.R. 876 (1924), 110 A.L.R. 774 (1937).
1961]
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assignee in certain cases, in no way recognizes any rights remaining in the assignor.
In light of these general rules relating to the effect of an assignment and
keeping in mind the wording of the proof of loss in Steele v. Goosen,27 which is
indicative of the general language used in the assignment of such claims under an
insurance contract, there is seemingly no inherent difficulty in reaching a decision
as to the proper party to bring the action: undoubtedly the insurance carrier is
the real party in interest in such a situation. If the assignor-insured makes a com-
plete assignment of his entire claim he no longer has any legal or equitable rights
therein, and thus no standing in court upon which to base an action.
3. Special Problem: Assignment of a Claim for Property Damages
With Retention of a Claim for Personal Injuries
A commonly occurring situation concerns an assignment to the collision insurer
of the entire claim of the insured against a third party for property damages where,
in the same occurrence, the insured has suffered personal injuries as welL This
necessitates a different analysis in applying the real party in interest statute. It
is generally held by the courts, including those of Missouri,28 that when a person
sustains both personal injuries and property damage in the same collision there is
but one cause of action accruing to the injured party. Thus, if the injured party
brought action for personal injuries only and later attempted to bring a separate
action to recover property damages the doctrine of merger and the principles
against the splitting of a cause of action would be invoked against him. What is
the situation under the real party in interest statute where there has been an assign-
ment of a claim for property damages and a retention of the personal injury claim?
Without more, it would seem that this would be a partial assignment and subject
to special rules, to be examined hereafter;29 but the Missouri courts seemingly have
said that this is not so.
The general problem arose in General Exck. Ins. Corp. v. Yong,30 where the
plaintiff was the collision insurer of the injured party who had received $342 of
$367 property loss. The defendant was informed of the payment and of the fact
that the insured had executed an instrument which purported to assign to the
insurance company any claim which she might have against any person causing
property damage. The insured had subsequently filed a separate petition asking
$5000 for personal injuries against the defendant. This suit had been dropped in
consideration of $500, and the insured had executed an instrument which purported
to release the defendant from liability for both property damage and personal in-
juries. The court recognized that an assignment of a part of a single cause of action
does not entitle the assignee to 'bring a suit at law unless the defendant gives his
consent to such an assignment.-1 The court also recognized that a person could not
27. See text accompanying note 6 svpra.
28. See, e.g., Coy v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 186 Mo. App. 408, 172 S.W. 446
(Spr. Ct. App. 1914).
29. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
30. 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W.2d 396 (1948).
31. Id. at 1104, 212 S.W.2d at 398-399.
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sue for both property damage and personal injury in different suits when they arise
from the same transaction; nevertheless the court allowed suit by the insurer,
saying: "[TIhe facts in the instant case furnish a reasonable exception to the rule
against splitting or perhaps it is more accurate to say there has been no split of
the cause of action, but the creation of two separate causes of action. '3 2 The court
further said:
Conceding, but not deciding, the claim cannot be split so as to authorize
suits for property damage by both the owner and the insured, yet if the
insurer either pays the insured his entire property loss33 or pays him a sum
less and receives an assignment of the whole claim, as was done in this
case, the insured has no further interest in property damages. Under those
circumstances the insurer is the real party and the only party interested
in collecting property damages and should be permitted to sue in his own
name. Tms two separate causes of action may arise from the same occur-
reznce.84 (Emphasis added.)
While it appears that the court here laid down two theories upon which its decision
might be based, it would seem that the more practical basis for the decision would
be to say that in such a situation two causes of action arise where only one existed
before, rather than formulating exceptions to the rules against partial assignments
and splitting causes of action. Of course if personal injury claims are not assignable
in Missouri,.3 the assignment in the Young case can be distinguished from the usual
partial assignment of a claim that is wholly assignable.
32. Id. at 1107, 212 S.W.2d at 400.
33. Is this dictum to the effect that where there is full indemnification by the
insurance company, the suit must be brought in the company's name, even though
only a subrogation is involved? The phrase "and receives an assignment of the
whole claim" could be read to apply to both of the two immediately preceding
phrases, which are in the disjunctive. But if this is so, what is the meaning of "as
was done in this case"?
34. 357 Mo. at 1107, 212 S.W.2d at 401.
35. It is generally recognized in Missouri that the test of assignability of a
chose in action is whether or not the claim will survive to the personal representa-
tive of a person in case of death. State ex rel. Park Nat'l Bank v. Globe Indemnity
Co., 61 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1933). Before the enactment of any statutes relating to
survival of actions Missouri followed the common law rule that unliquidated claims
for personal injuries would not survive, and hence were not assignable. Davis v.
Morgan, 97 Mo. 79 (1888); Schubert v. Herzberg, 65 Mo. App. 66 (K.C. Ct. App.
1896); Alexander v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 54 Mo. App. 66 (K.C. Ct. App. 1893)
(dictum). Even after certain statutes were passed which seemed to provide that
actions for personal injuries would survive, the courts maintained the rule of non-
assignability. See, e.g., McLeland v. St. Louis Transit Co., 105 Mo. App. 66, 80
S.W. 30 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904). In only one of the early cases was the effective
statute even noted, and there it seems the construction was completely out of line
with the wording of the statute. Beechwood v. Joplin-Pittsburg Ry. Co., 173 Mo.
App. 371 (Spr. Ct. App. 1913). Some of the early statutes admittedly might have
been construed as providing for survivability only where an action had .been com-
menced before the decedent's death, but not even this alternative was taken. In
this regard see Kramer v. Laspe, 94 S.W.2d 1090 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936). See also
§ 5438, RSMo 1909; § 4231, RSMo 1919; § 3280, RSMo 1929; § 3670, RSMo 1939.
The present Missouri statute, Section 537.020, RSMo 1949, would seem to say that
a claim for personal injuries will survive to the decedent's representative; but
apparently there have been no cases decided under this statute.
19611
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It should be noted that the court in Steele v. Goosen, in dismissing the action
as to the assigned property damage and allowing the action to proceed as to the
insured's personal injuries, followed the decision of the Young case, apparently
holding that two causes of action existed rather than one.
4. Validity of a Partial Assignment
The decision in the Young case could 'be called an exception to the general
rule relating to partial assignments. The Supreme Court of Nebraska well sum-
marized the modern view of the majority of the courts38 in this regard:
The common-law rule is that a creditor may not without the consent of a
debtor split up the debt by assignment. The debtor is entitled to pay the
debt in solido. Notice of the assignment does not destroy the right. In
consequence of this rule, under the common law, an assignee of a part of a
demand cannot enforce an assignment in an action at law unless there has
been an acceptance on the part of the debtor. The general rule is that where
there is an assignment of a fractional part of an entire right the assignee
must resort to equity to enforce that right and in doing so bring before
the court all parties in interest. The conclusion therefore is that an action
at law upon a partial assignment may not be maintained against the debtor
of an assignor alone in the absence of acceptance of the assignment by
the debtor.8 7
Professor Williston asserts that this limitation is founded on the theory of lack of
legal title in the assignee. 8 He does point out that some courts do hold that where
there is a partial assignment and the debtor makes no objection he thereby becomes
liable to the partial assignee.39
Missouri, however, has formulated a peculiar and substantially different doc-
trine in regard to the element of consent; otherwise Missouri is in accord with the
majority of courts. It is the rule in Missouri apparently that a partial assignment
is enforceable neither at law nor in equity unless the debtor gives his consent, and
without such consent the assignment has no effect at all. 40
It seems, then, that where there has -been a partial assignment, apart from the
circumstances involved in the Young case, the assignor must bring the action to
enforce the claim unless there has been consent to the assignment by the third
party. This principle was applied in Cable v. St. Louis Marine Ry. & Dock Co.,41
which involved a boat which was lost through the negligence of the defendant.
There was insurance on three-fourths of the boat and the part insured was aban-
doned by the plaintiff-owner to, and accepted by, the underwriters. The plaintiff-
36. See 3 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 12, § 442.
37. First Nat'l Bank v. Gross Real Estate Co., 162 Neb. 343, 348-350, 75
N.W.2d 704, 708-709 (1956).
38. See 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 12, § 442.
39. Ibid. The jurisdictions Mr. Williston refers to are Minnesota, Oklahoma
and Utah. He also asserts that Missouri follows this rule, citing a Kansas City
Court of Appeals decision, Friedman v. Griffith, 196 S.W. 75 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917).
40. The earliest case on this point was Burnett v. Crandall, 63 Mo. 410 (1876).
See also Loomis v. Robinson, "76 Mo. 488 (1882), approved Webster v. Sterling
Finance Co., 351 Mo. 754, 173 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1943).
41. 21 Mo. 133 (1855).
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owner then brought an action for the entire amount of the loss. The defendant
moved for dismissal as to the insured three-fourths on the theory that the right
of action as to that portion was in the insurance company because the abandonment
constituted an assignment of that part of his interest. The court agreed there had
been a partial assignment but sustained the owner's right to sue, pointing out that
the real party in interest provisions did not affect the common law rule regarding
the legal title holder's right to bring action in his own name upon a claim. The
court said that the assignee could bring the action only when he was the assignee
of an entire claim.42
In Swift & Co. v. Wabask Ry. Co.43 the court was also concerned with a par-
tial assignment. In that case property was damaged by sparks from a locomotive,
and the owner of the damaged property had insurance with three separate com-
panies, each of which paid one-third of the loss and took an assignment of one-
third of the owner's claim against the railway company. The owner then brought
action to recover for all damages sustained. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
held that although the plaintiff had assigned its entire beneficial interest, it could
maintain the suit. The court indicated, however, that had the full loss been re-
imbursed by only one insurer the suit could have been brought in that insurer's
name. The court said:
The defendant did not consent to any assignment of plaintiff's cause of
action, and the rule is well settled that, under the rule prohibiting the
splitting of a cause of action, a portion of a debt, claim, or judgment is
incapable of assignment in the absence of the debtor's consent.44
Cable and Swift thus are in line with the Missouri rule regarding partial assign-
ments, viz., that they are ineffective in the absence of the debtor's consent. They
are also authority that the assignor of part of a claim retains legal title to his
cause of action, and that this is sufficient to maintain an action. Therefore the
partial assignor is in the same position as the subrogor-insured under the rule
in the Hayes case.
B. Subrogation
Some authorities do not distinguish "assignment" from "subrogation" in con-
nection with the real party in interest provisions. This position is sometimes said
to be based on the practical consideraton that the insurance carrier is, in either
instance, entitled to the fruits of the action4 5 However, the Missouri courts have
recognized this distinction as controlling in applying section 507.010.
Subrogation is a creature of equity and the right of subrogation is "called into
existence for the purpose of enabling a party who has paid the debt to reap the
benefit of all remedies which the creditor may hold against the principal debt-
or .... ,"6 In legal theory, in the insurance situation when there is payment to the
insured the subrogor-insured remains the legal owner of the cause of action and
42. Id. at 135.
43. 149 Mo. App. 526, 131 S.W. 124 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
44. Id. at 533, 131 S.W. at 126.
45. Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Ride: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 926 (1957).
46. VANCE, INSURANCE § 134 (3rd ed. 1951).
19611
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the insurance company becomes the beneficial owner thereof, to the extent of
indemnification.'7 And legal title to a cause of action has always been held in
Missouri to be sufficient to allow the holder thereof to bring suit in his own name
as the real party in interest.48 This principle was of course specifically applied to
the automobile insurance subrogation situation in Hayes v. Jenkins. On the other
hand, if at the time of indemnification the insured executes an assignment in favor
of the insurer, a complete divestment of all rights occurs and as a result the insured-
assignor is without any rights whatsoever.49 A transfer of rights has occurred and
the insurance company becomes the real party in interest, for the entire cause of
action is in the assignee. The Missouri case of Steele v. Goosen applies this rule
very clearly in the automobile insurance field.
This, however, is not the result reached in most jurisdictions. In a majority of
states the courts take the position that there is no distinction between assignment
and subrogation and the question of whether the insurer or the insured is the real
party in interest turns on the finding as to whether the indemnification is full or
partial. The conclusion usually reached in most jurisdictions is that the insured
remains the real party in interest where he is only partially indemnified, whereas
the insurer is the real party in interest where it has fully paid for the property
loss. 0 The Missouri cases would not distinguish between partial and full indemnifi-
cation of property loss in determining the real party in interest in the subrogation
situation, i.e., where there is a policy provision merely reiterating the common law
rights of subrogation 5' or where there is no express policy provision and no assign-
ment.52
1. Partial Indemnification
Partial indemnification occurs most often in the situations where the policy
provides for a deductible amount or where there is only collision coverage and
personal injury also results from a collision. In these situations it is generally
recognized, in Missouri53 and elsewhere, 54 that, despite partial or full payment for
47. Pringle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra note 13.
48. Matthews v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 645, 44 S.W. 802 (1897);
Beattie v. Lett, 28 Mo. 596 (1859); Cable v. St. Louis Marine Ry. & Dock Co.,
supra note 41; Hayes v. Jenkins, 337 S.W.2d 259 (Spr. Ct. App. 1960); Meyer
Jewelry Co. v. Professional Bldg. Co., 307 S.W.2d 517 (K.C. Ct. App. 1957);
Keeley v. Indemnity Co. of America, 222 Mo. App. 439, 7 S.W.2d 434 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1928); Sexton v. Anderson Elec. Car Co., 234 S.W. 358 (K.C. Ct. App. 1921);
Foster v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 143 Mo. App. 547, 128 S.W. 36 (Spr. Ct. App.
1910); Swift & Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra note 43; Haysler v. Dawson, 28 Mo.
App. 531 (K.C. Ct. App. 1888).
49. See authorities cited supra note 12.
50. See Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1233 (1945), for a collection of the cases.
51. A standard automobile insurance policy reads as merely a reiteration of
the common law right of subrogation: "Subrogation. In the event of any payment
under this policy, the company shall be subrogated to all of the insured's rights to
recovery therefor against any person or organization and the insured shall execute
and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights. The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights."
52. Hayes v. Jenkins, sapra note 48.
53. Busch Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276
S.W. 614 (1925); Swift & Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra note 43 (dictum).
54. See Annot., supra note 50.
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the property loss involved, the right of action against the wrongdoer remains in
the insured and the action (for the entire loss) may be brought by him in his own
name. Indeed most courts would hold that the insured must bring the action where
he is only partially indemnified and that the insurance company cannot bring an
action in its own name. 5 Authority is scarce in Missouri on this point, though what
there is would indicate that the state can be classified with the majority.r" In such
a case the insured may recover the full value of the property damage from the
tortfeasor but as to the amount paid to him by the insurer he becomes a trustee,
with the obligation to pay over to the carrier that amount.57
This result seems sound. Its reasoning rests upon the right of the defendant
not to have the cause split so that he is compelled to defend two actions predicated
upon the same wrongful act. Such a severance is avoided where suit is brought in
the name of the insured.
Although the insured is the real party in interest in the normal partial in-
demnification situation, if the insured settles with the tortfeasor to the extent of
the unindemnified portion of the loss sustained,5s or is reluctant to bring the
action,"" the right of the insurance company to proceed for its portion of the loss
55. Id.
56. Missouri early did no more than recognize that most jurisdictions followed
the rule that a partial subrogee could not bring suit in its own name. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 74 Mo. App. 106, 115 (K.C. Ct. App. 1898).(However, compare the result in this case, where the insured had released his
interest.) The Missouri Supreme Court has recognized the rule, but without dis-
cussion. Busch Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., supra note 53. It was
6nly dictum, however, for the reason that the court had only to decide that the
partial subrogor could bring the action in his own name and not that the action
must be so brought. In Subscribers v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 230 Mo. App.
468, 91 S.W.2d 227 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936), the court seems to consider it a settled
rule of law that a partial subrogee cannot maintain an action in its own name, but
cites no authority that will support the proposition, except by analogy to the
partial assignment cases. Cf. Helderman v. Von Hoffman Corp., infra note 72.
57. Baker v. Fortney, 299 S.W.2d 563 (K.C. Ct. App. 1957); Swift & Co.
v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra note 43 (dictum).
58. Where the company partially indemnifies an insured, who thereafter pur-
ports to release to the tortfeasor the whole claim, the question of whether the
insurance company can sue in its own name is in doubt. The Kansas City Court of
Appeals held in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra note 56, that the
insurance company could bring an action to recover in its own name, at least where
there was notice to the tortfeasor of the company's rights. The release was held
ineffective as to the company's rights on the theory that it was an attempted fraud
on the insurance company. But in Subscribers v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., supra
note 56, the same court held directly to the contrary; but the Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. case was not cited, so perhaps it was not called to the attention of the court.
Subscribers v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. is questionable as authority also for the
reason that the Supreme Court disapproved of its holding to the extent it is in-
consistent with the opinion in General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, supra note 30.
59. If the insured refuses to bring suit in his name, the insurance company
may have an action against the insured for breach of the cooperation clause of the
policy, the measure of damages presumably being that which the company would
have gained if the policy holder had cooperated. This course of action necessitates
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should not be defeated. 60 The result might be otherwise where the insured attempts
to release the entire claim for a fair consideration, and the tortfeasor has no notice
of the rights of the insurance company.6'
2. Full indemnification
Where the insurance carrier indemnifies the insured to the full extent of the
property damage sustained and is fully subrogated to the rights of the insured in
respect thereto, either by operation of the law or by virtue of a provision in the
policy merely reiterating what the law would provide in the absence of the pro-
vision, the earlier Missouri decisions indicated that the insured would remain the
proper party to bring the suit.2 As a matter of fact, the early case of Sexton v.
Anderson Elec. Car Co.63 seems to have been a clear holding to that effect. There
the plaintiff had been paid by his insurer for loss of his car, and had turned it
over to the company with a bill of sale therefor. The plaintiff actually testified at
the trial that the money to be recovered was for the insurance company and not
for himself, that he merely allowed the company to bring the suit in his name as
provided in the policy, and that he had no interest in the result of the lawsuit.
The court recognized that "where the insurer pays to the assured the full amount
of the loss, the insurer is subrogated by operation of law to all of the assured's
rights of action against third persons who may be responsible for the loss,"64 but
concluded nevertheless that the insurer was the proper party to bring the suit.
The court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff had retained legal title to the
cause of action, the bill of sale for the car not being an assignment, and that the
agreement between the insurance company and plaintiff as to division of money
or how suit should be prosecuted against defendant was no concern of the latter.
But the recent Springfield Court of Appeals case of Hayes v. Jenkins can be said
to be the most definitive decision upon the precise question, for the reason that it
followed so close in time Steele v. Goosen, and therefore the court was forced to
consider more fully the difference between assignment and subrogation. The court
in the Hayes case assumed there had been full payment to the insured but never-
a suit in the company's name, and may also be disadvantageous when the insured is
impecunious. Many policies of course give the company the right to institute suit
in the insured's name. Apparently there is no authority in Missouri recognizing that
an insurance company can enforce its rights in equity.
60. See 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcrIcE § 4931 (1942).
61. Ibid.
62. First Nat'l Bank v. Produce Exch. Bank, 338 Mo. 91, 89 S.W.2d 33 (1935);
Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Professional Bldg. Co., supra note 48; Glenn v. Thompson,
228 Mo. App. 1087, 61 S.W.2d 210 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933); Keeley v. Indemnity
Co. of America, supra note 48. See also the complete discussion of the subject of
assignment and subrogation in Swift & Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra note 43. These
cases should be compared with other cases in Missouri holding that where the
insured has been indemnified for the whole loss sustained, regardless of whether
the insurance company must bring the action in its own name, it can do so. Lumber-
man's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 149 Mo. 165, 50 S.W.
281 (1899); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 123 Mo. App. 513, 100 S.W.
569 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907); Foster v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 48 (dictum).
63. Supra note 48.
64. 234 S.W. at 359.
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theless concluded that the subrogor-insured was the proper party to bring the
action.
Why should the insurer-assignee be the real party in interest, as previously
concluded, and the insurer-subrogee be outside the operation of the Missouri real
party in interest provisions? To effect a solution to the problem it is first pertinent
to inquire into the legislative motivation behind the real party in interest provisions,
and in so doing examine the defects which the legislature sought to remedy by
enacting the statute.
It has been said that the principal reason for the requirement that an action
be prosecuted by the real party in interest was to protect the tortfeasor against
multiple suits based upon the same wrongful act. 5 If this be so, a construction of
the provisions should be directed towards attaining this end. Therefore, the ques-
tion of who is the real party in interest should become: the discharge of a judgment
in whose favor will fully protect the tortfeasor? A suit by the subrogor bars a
subsequent suit by the subrogee;66 this is the test as to who is the real party in
interest according to our Supreme Court in Quinn v. Van Raalte,67 wherein the
court said: "ERecovery . . .will fully protect the defendant if another action be
brought against him upon the same state of facts. These facts authorize the con-
clusion that the plaintiff is the real party in interest."68 The Supreme Court there-
fore recognizes that the insured may sue, recover, (which will forever protect the
defendant) and hold the proceeds for the benefit of the insurance company.
On the other hand, if the insurer-subrogee is named the real party in interest
where it has fully indemnified the insured for his property loss, successive suits
may be necessary if the insured is to be reimbursed for his whole loss, for the
insurance company in any case is entitled to recover no more than the amount paid
the insured. But the insured may have other rights, for instance in the typical
automobile collision case a right to recover for loss of use69 and other miscellaneous
damages.70 If the insured could proceed independently to recover for these items,
this would involve an additional action, the necessity of which is directly contrary
to the intention of the legislators in enacting the real party in interest statute to
avoid a multiplicity of suits. As a practical matter, this would place an unnecessary
burden on the parties to the insurance contract, the defendant, and the courts.
But under present Missouri law it would seem that the insured could not
proceed independently to recover for miscellaneous damages above and beyond loss
65. Powers v. Ellis, 103 N.E.2d 907 (Ind. 1952).
66. Glenn v. Thompson, s'upra note 62, and cases cited therein.
67. 276 Mo. 71, 205 S.W. 59 (1918). This was also recognized as the test
for determining the real party in interest in Matthews v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.,
supra note 48; Glenn v. Thompson, supra note 62; Keeley v. Indemnity Co. of
America, supra note 48; Guerney v. Moore, 131 Mo. 650, 32 S.W. 1132 (1895).
68. Id. at 103, 205 S.W. at 68.
69. See, e.g., Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 335 Mo. 695, 197 S.W.2d 657
(1947).
70. The most important items are the costs of towing and storage. Recovery
for these items is allowed. Gilwee v. Pabst Brewing Co., 195 Mo. App. 487, 193
S.W. 886 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917); Conley v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 259 S.W. 153
(K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
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in value of his automobile. The Missouri Supreme Court has said that causes of
action which are not independent and distinct are not permitted to be severed and
prosecuted separately.71 Property damage and resulting loss of use, towing and
storage expenses, etc., would not seem to be of such a nature as to be considered
independent and distinct. Naming the insurer-subrogee the real party in interest
then would give the defendant a windfall by allowing him to avoid responsibility
for loss of use and other miscellaneous damages and at the same time deprive the
injured party of an amount to which he would ordinarily be entitled. For this
reason it would seem that in any case where the insured seeks to recover damages
for loss of use, towing, storage and other items as to which he has not been in-
demnified under the insurance contract, and for which he would usually be allowed
to recover, in addition to loss in value, the court should conclude that the insured
is the real party in interest.
Admittedly joinder of the insurer and insured under the Missouri rules72 might
be a solution to the problem, but this is not an entirely satisfactory answer because
of possible jury prejudice where the insurance company is present in the case. It
also might be seriously questioned whether, while the procedural rules may permit
such a joinder, the policy underlying the real party in interest statute is such as
to compel it.
There is another right recognized by Missouri law of which the insured might
be deprived if the insurer-subrogee is named the real party in interest. This is the
right of an innocent party to recover punitive damages in certain cases. And in
this area under existing Missouri law the possible solution of joinder of the insured
and insurer in one action is even less likely to be available. In Carnes v. ThompsonT3
the Supreme Court determined that actual damages, either substantial or nominal,
must be found as a predicate for recovery of exemplary damages. If the insurance
company is named the real party in interest after having fully indemnified the
insured for property loss, the carrier can proceed only for the amount paid and
71. See M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 320 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1959), and .cases
cited therein.
72. Mo. R. Crv. P. § 52.05 (1960). This section provides in part: "All persons
may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally,
or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common
to all of them will arise in the action. . ..
In Helderman v. Von Hoffman Corp., 260 S.W.2d 333 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953),
the court did allow joinder of the insurance company and the insured. But in that
case suit was by the insurance company seeking to recover only property damages
resulting from collision occasioned by a bailee's negligence, and by the bailor seeking
to recover only for theft of tools from the car while bailed, and by bailor guests
for loss of personal property from the car. The court said joinder was proper because
no splitting was involved since separate claims were presented, notwithstanding all
arose from the same occurrence. Actually the decision seems to be nothing but
a logical extension of General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, supra note 30. It should
be noted, however, that Helderman is not authority for the proposition that the
insurance company and insured can be joined where the former seeks to recover
for property damages and the latter seeks to recover for resulting loss of use and
other miscellaneous damages.
73. 48 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1952).
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the insured is excluded from recovering such damages, for he cannot satisfy the
condition precedent of actual or nominal damages. Once the balance of conflicting
policy considerations has been struck in favor of allowing recovery of punitive
damages, it may be questioned whether the right should be denied merely because
of payment pursuant to an insurance contract.
In line with the same general legislative policy of reduction of the number of
suits, if the defendant seeks to assert a counterclaim, and the insurance carrier is
prosecuting the action, the defendant will not be permitted to do so, for the in-
surance carrier under the collision contract is not liable to respond to claims based
on the fault of the insured.74 In this connection, the question arises as to the effect
of the Missouri compulsory counterclaim provision which provides that all counter-
claims arising out of the same transaction inust be asserted at the time of the
principal suit.7 5 This question remains unanswered by Missouri courts.
Another of the announced purposes in enacting the real party in interest
statute was to simplify pleadings in the single court system.76 Before consolidation
of the courts of law and equity two rules were in existence: the common law rule
of nominal parties and the equitable rule of real parties in interest. The codifiers
chose to adopt the equitable rule 77 But the codes were not promulgated with the
intention of varying the substantive rights in any respect, i.e., to give a new cause
of action where none before existed or to deprive one of a cause of action where
one did exist previously. That holding the insurer-subrogee is the real party in
interest may in many cases interfere with the substantive rights of the insured has
been illustrated above, and therefore in those cases such a holding would also be
contrary to this announced purpose of the legislature.
The Missouri cases seemingly have never commented at length on the purpose
of this state's real party in interest provision, section 507.010. It can be seen that
in many cases, 7 8 typified by Quinn v. Van Raalte,79 the courts have emphasized
multiplicity of suits as the evil sought to be remedied by the statute. Most of the
Missouri cases comment on the purpose of the statute only negatively. For instance
in Hayes v. Jenkins and in a great many cases decided previously" the attitude
of the court (never expressed) seems simply to be that it was not the purpose of
the statute to abrogate the long-standing principle that legal titie is sufficient to
enable one to bring an action. In the Hayes case and the earlier cases one can also
see the more or less negative approach that it was not the purpose of the statute
to make that which was foreign to the case-the existence of an insurance contract
and payment pursuant thereto-a live issue. This attitude of the courts can be
74. Admittedly in many, if not most, cases the collision carrier also provides
liability coverage; but this is immaterial in states such as Missouri not having a
direct action provision, for the liability carrier is not obligated to respond until the
claim against the insured is reduced to judgment. See §§ 379.195-.200, RSMo 1949.
75. Mo. R. Civ. P. § 55.45 (1960).
76. Atkinson, supra note 45.
77. Ibid.
78. See cases cited supra note 67.
79. Supra note 67.
80. See cases cited supra note 48.
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criticized insofar as cases cited to support it8 in the main involve the question of
whether indemnity of the plaintiff under an insurance contract will either defeat or
reduce a defendant's liability. The defendant in the cited cases was not contending
that the insurance company was the real party in interest, or that his obligation,
if any, was owed to someone else, but rather that his liability to the plaintiff, if any,
should be reduced to the extent that plaintiff had already been indemnified on the
theory that otherwise plaintiff would receive double compensation s2
There is another policy consideration which should perhaps be recognized in
applying the real party in interest statute. This is the danger of jury prejudice
resulting from the presence of the insurance company-subrogee as plaintiff. Tradi-
tionally there exists a policy against disclosing the fact of insurance to the jury.8 3
This policy is founded upon the reasoning that insurance is not relevant in the
case and upon the belief that juries will be inclined to favor the party opposing the
insurance company. If the policy against such disclosure is strong, as it appears
to be in Missouri, there is no reason why the court should not consider the matter
when construing and applying the real party in interest provision, even though
the policy against disclosure originally arose to protect the interests of a defendant
and here it would be utilized to protect the affirmative right of an insurance com-
pany. In light of the language of the court in the Hayes case,84 it is possible that
this consideration was weighed in the balance in favor of sustaining the prosecution
of the suit by the insured-subrogor in preference to disclosing the insurance com-
pany's interest.
III. METHODS OF AvomINo DISCLOSURE
If the Steele case is not confined to assignment situations, but rather extended
to subrogation cases as well, or if the insurance companies wish to avoid the ques-
tion of real party in interest altogether, they may attempt to utilize certain devices
currently in use elsewhere8s5 to avoid compulsory prosecution of suits in the com-
panies' names.
Insurance companies have utilized the device of the "loan receipt" as the sub-
stitute for a payment which would give rise to subrogation, as well as the device
of "assignment-reassignment," which revests in the insured the legal title to the
81. See, e.g., the cases cited by the court in Hayes v. Jenkins when it evinces
this attitude. 337 S.W.2d at 261.
82. See especially Wells v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 39 S.W.2d 409 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1931), Ormsby v. A.B.C. Fireproof Warehouse Co., 214 Mo. App. 336,
253 S.W. 491 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923), and Erhart v. Wabash Ry. Co., 136 Mo. App.
617, 118 S.W. 657 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909), all three of which were cited in the Hayes
case.
83. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Arndt, 332 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. 1960); Murphy v.
Graves, 294 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1956); Whitman v. Carver, 337 Mo. 1247, 88 S.W.2d
885 (1935); Ryternsky v. O'Brine, 335 Mo. 22, 70 S.W.2d 538 (1934).
Professors Wigmore and McCormick have been the most open critics of this
traditional position. See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 282a (3rd ed. 1940); McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 168 (1954).
84. 337 S.W.2d at 261.
85. See Annot., supra note 50.
[Vol. 26
15
Greene and Lloyd: Green: Automobile Insurance--Assignment, Subrogation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
COMMENTS
action. The validity of these devices, and their effect as far as the real party in
interest provisions are concerned, has been questioned, with various results de-
pending on the jurisdiction and peculiar facts of the particular case.
A. Loan Receipt
The transaction involving the loan receipt 86 has been construed by numerous
courts as being a loan or advancement to be recovered back, which does not
subrogate the insurance company to the rights of the person to whom the money
has been advanced or loaned.87 By the utilization of the loan receipt device as a
substitute for payment, the end effect is to create an extrinsic contract and rights
flowing therefrom in favor of the insurance company to recover from the insured
to the extent of the loan. Being a wholly separate transaction, no question con-
cerning subrogation arises at all, since the loan is not construed as a payment for
the loss.88
The Missouri Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the loan receipt
device, but has not directly passed upon the question of whether or not it gives
rise to any rights by way of subrogation. In Halferty v. National Mut. Ca. Co.s9
the court, while apparently sanctioning use of the loan receipt, resolved the real
party in interest question solely upon the narrow ground that legal title to the
cause of action remained in the insured. This conclusion of course does no more
than recognize that the insured is in at least the same position as where uncondi-
tional payment is received and the insurance company is subrogated to the rights
of the insured to the extent of payment.
At least one jurisdiction, New York, requires that the loan provision be in
the contract of insurance and a transaction resulting in a loan receipt not so pro-
vided for will be treated as unconditional payment.9 0 New York courts have also
taken the position that where the insurance policy provides that the insurer might
discharge its liability to the insured either by loan or by payment, the loan receipt
does not constitute payment; but where the policy does not authorize the insurer
to discharge its liability to the insured by a loan, but only by payment, the loan
has the legal effect of payment.91 Missouri has not yet determined this question, and
to say whether the receipt unconnected with a corresponding provision in the con-
tract would be treated as payment by the Missouri courts would be mere con-
jecture. It is difficult to see how the question would arise in Missouri, for the ques-
tion in this state is not whether unconditional payment has been made, but whether
legal title to the cause of action has been transferred.
86. The "Loan Receipt" generally provides: "The insurer may discharge its
liabilities to the insured either by payment or by loan; in the event the company
elects to discharge its liabilities by way of loan, such loan will be repayable only
from any recovery on account of the loss."
87. See Annot., supra note 50.
88. See the discussion of this proposition as approved by other jurisdictions in
Halferty v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 296 S.W.2d 130 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956).
89. Id..
90. Adler v. Bush Terminal Co., 161 Misc. 509, 291 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1936);
Lee v. Barrett, 82 Misc. 475, 144 N.Y. Supp. 941 (1913).
91. Lee v. Barrett, supra note 90.
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In Missouri an assignment of a claim for the purpose of suit only, obligating
the assignee to account for the proceeds to the assignor, enables the assignee to
sue in his own name. 3 This is on the theory that the assignee is trustee of an
express trust; as such he would fall within an exception to the real party in interest
provision.94 In Petrikin v. Ckicago, R. L & P. R. Co.9 5 the federal court, purport-
ing to follow Missouri law, said that where there was an assignment under a colli-
sion insurance contract of all rights against the tortfeasor, they were divested by
the insurer's reassignment of the claim to the insured for the purpose of suit and
the insurer was not the real party in interest in an action against the tortfeasor.
The legal effect of such an assignment is to revest in and restore to the insured
the entire legal title to the original claim that the insured had against the defendant
as a result of the collision, consequently divesting the insurance company of legal
title. Under Missouri law after such a reassignment the insured would be the real
party in interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Missouri in connection with the assignment of claims the law may be sum-
marized as follows. Where there is an assignment of the entire claim, the assignee
must appear in the action as the real party in interest. But when there is only a
partial assignment of the claim further distinctions must be drawn. Where the
insurer is assigned a property damage claim and personal injuries arose out of the
same occurrence, the company may be able to bring an action separate from that
brought by the insured although there is the possibility of having the parties
joined in a single suit. In the other partial assignment situations the assignor must
bring the action, for legal title to the entire claim remains with him, and in Mis-
souri this is the criterion for determining the real party in interest.
If the company indemnifies the insured and is subrogated to his rights under
common law rules of subrogation, or by virtue of a contract provision merely
reiterating what the law would otherwise provide, the following conclusions are
reached by Missouri cases. If there is partial indemnification, far from the insur-
ance company being forced to bring suit in its own name, there is some authority
that the company cannot do so. And even if the insured is fully indemnified for
property loss, and the damages sought do not exceed that amount, suit can still
be brought in the insured's name, he remaining the holder of legal title. It may be
92. The reassignment provisions generally provide: "This assignment to rein-
vest in the insured all rights, claims, and causes of action (which had existed prior
to this assignment in the insurance company) for the purpose of collection, suit,
and action thereon and if any recovery is had as a consequence of said action,
plaintiff is primarily responsible to the assignor to the extent of the amount paid
under the policy."
93. Schepman v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 231 Mo. App. 651,
104 S.W.2d 777 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
94. Haysler v. Dawson, supra note 48; Webb v. Morgan, 14 Mo. 428 (1851);
City of St. Louis to use of Becker v. Rudolph, 36 Mo. 465 (1865); City of Kansas
to use of Enright v. Rice, 89 Mo. 685 (1880).
95. 15 F.R.D. 346 (D.C.W.D. Mo. 1954).
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questioned whether this last conclusion conflicts with the spirit of the real party
in interest statute. Nevertheless there are other policy considerations which lend
support to this conclusion, such as avoidance of disclosure of the insurer's interest
in the cause, protection of the insured's right to recover damages for loss of use
and other miscellaneous items, avoidance of any attempt at bringing a multiplicity
of suits, and affording the defendant the opportunity to press any counterclaim he
might have.
It would appear that an insurance company can avoid appearance in a suit in
Missouri if that is its desire. But the insurance companies must become cognizant
of the fact that they cannot have their cake and eat it too. The court's very sum-
mary handling of the question of construction of the instrument executed in favor
of the insurance company in Steele v. Goosen stands as a warning to other insur-
ance companies to check the wording of their policies and proofs of loss or equiv-
alent instruments very carefully.
If the Steele case is not confined to assignment situations or if the insurance
companies wish to avoid the question of real party in interest altogether, there are
certain devices which may be available. The loan receipt is one such device, but
since its use may well leave the insurance company in no better position than if
it had to rely on the doctrine of subrogation, the loan receipt possibly will not
serve the purpose for which it would be intended. The assignment-reassignment
device would seem to be better adapted to use as a method of avoiding disclosure
for its validity seems to be clear. This device will probably find greater use by the
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